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A B ST R ACT. The "CSI effect" is a term that legal authorities and the mass media have coined
to describe a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI: Crime Scene Investigation
has on juror behavior. Some have claimed that jurors who see the high-quality forensic evidence
presented on CSI raise their standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more
flawed and uncertain. As a result, these CSI-affected jurors are alleged to acquit defendants more
frequently. This Review argues that, while some existing evidence on juror decisionmaking is
consistent with the CSI effect, it is equally plausible that watching CSI has the opposite impact
on jurors and increases their tendency to convict. The perceived rise in acquittals can also
plausibly be explained without any reference either to watching CSI or to viewing crime dramas
more generally. For these reasons, and because no direct research supports the existence or
delineates the nature of the CSI effect, calls for changes to the legal system are premature. More
generally, the issues raised by current attention to the CSI effect illustrate the problems that arise
when proposed changes in the legal system are supported by plausible, but empirically untested,
"factual" assertions.
A U T H O R. Tom R. Tyler is a University Professor at New York University. He teaches in the
Psychology Department and the Law School. Professor Tyler is an Associate Editor of the Annual
Review of Law and Social Science. This Review benefited greatly from comments made by Jeff
Rachlinski and Neil Vidmar.
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INTRODUCTION
The television drama CSI: Crime Scene Investigation is by all conventional
measures a successful production. It receives high ratings and has spun off a
lucrative franchise of related dramas-CSI: Miami and CSI: New York.1 As
their tides indicate, these shows are based on the process of gathering and
analyzing forensic evidence. Most episodes, however, focus on forensic
techniques that are more reminiscent of science fiction than true investigative
practice.
To understand the CSI series, consider a typical plot, which relates the
intertwined stories of three criminal investigations. As the episode Iced begins,
investigators encounter (i) a college-aged couple found dead amid evidence of
a romantic evening; (2) a middle-aged man found dead in a parking lot; and
(3) a man found dead in the middle of a crop circle. Through careful
examination and testing of evidence -or at least as much as can be shown in an
hour- the CSI team establishes that (i) the couple was poisoned by a jealous
female student (a science major) using carbon dioxide gas given off by hidden
dry ice; (2) the middle-aged man died of natural causes (but his body was
briefly stolen as part of a prank); and (3) the man from the crop circle was
frightened to death after being misled into thinking that he was being pushed
out of a helicopter one thousand feet in the air.2
Recently, the series has become the focus of increased media attention,
with magazines and newspapers speculating that the series has produced a
"CSI effect" among the general public.3 According to media reports, the
millions of people who watch the series develop unrealistic expectations about
the type of evidence typically available during trials, which, in turn, increases
the likelihood that they will have a "reasonable doubt" about a defendant's
guilt. Typical of mass media articles on this topic is The CSI Effect, a cover story
in U.S. News and World Report from April 2005.' The cover foreshadows the
1. Bill Keveney, Crime Pays for 'CSI'Franchise, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2004, at 1D.
a. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Iced (CBS television broadcast May 12, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.twiztv.conVscripts/csVseasonS/csi-S23.txt).
3. See, e.g., Stefan Lovgren, CSI Effect Is Mixed Blessing for Real Crime Labs, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2004, htp://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2oo4/o/o923_o4o923-
csi.htnl; Paul Rincon, CSI Shows Give 'Unrealistic View,' BBC NEws, Feb. 21, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk//hVscVtech/428433S.stm; Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 48; Jamie Stockwell, Defense Lawyers Hinge Cases on 'CSI'
Savtvy, WASH. POST, May 22, 20o5, at Al.
4. Roane, supra note 3.
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article's thesis by promising to explain "[h]ow TV is driving jury verdicts all
across America." According to the article, anecdotal evidence-based on
comments by legal authorities -suggests that juries are becoming less willing
to accept typical criminal trial evidence due to an instinct, derived from
watching television dramas, that such evidence should be more conclusive. In
reality, the kind of "smoking gun" evidence found on CSI is rarely available.
Typically, the state attempts to bear its burden by piecing together many types
of evidence, each having some probative value but also carrying a degree of
uncertainty and, potentially, error. According to the popular press, this makes
jurors less likely to convict.
For example, after the recent, well-publicized acquittal of Robert Blake,
jurors complained about the lack of fingerprints, DNA, and gunshot residue -
evidence not often available in criminal trials but frequently used on television.'
Similarly, an article in USA Today linked the acquittal of Robert Durst, who
was accused of murdering and dismembering a neighbor, to the CSI effect:
"To legal analysts, his case seemed an example of how shows such as CSI are
affecting action in courthouses across the USA by, among other things, raising
jurors' expectations of what prosecutors should produce at trial."6
While the CSI effect has been widely noted in the popular press, there is
little objective evidence demonstrating that the effect exists. As is often the case
with legal issues, the pace of public discussion has outstripped the ability of
scholars to research the issue. 7 Lacking any empirical data, discussions of the
CSI effect have instead been based upon the personal impressions of lawyers
and legal scholars. The argument that CSI has influenced jurors fits with many
people's intuitions - including those of judges and prosecutors - about how
jurors operate. In one study, interviews with over one hundred prosecutors
suggested that the CSI effect may "'have made juries more demanding of the
5. See Zofia Smardz, The Juty's Out: How 12 Reasonable People Got Hung Up on Reasonable
Doubt, WASH. POST, June 26, 2005, at B1.
6. Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at
1LA.
1. The rapid development of widely held views about the changing nature of litigation is not
new. After the O.J. Simpson verdict in Los Angeles and the mistrial of the Menendez
brothers, the media discussed the idea of juries becoming increasingly "acquittal prone." Yet
when social scientists looked at acquittal rates in federal trials and across five states, they did
not find statistical evidence to support this widely assumed "fact." See Neil Vidmar et al.,
Should We Rush To Reform the Criminal Jury?: Consider Conviction Rate Data, 8o JUDICATURE
286, 287-89 (1997). This example illustrates potential problems that can arise when legal
changes are based upon opinions, even if widely held, that are later found to be unsupported
by data.
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prosecutors and the police," an argument also supported by the accounts of
jury deliberations gathered by some investigators. 9 Further, many prosecutors
are seeking training in the presentation of evidence because they believe that
juries demand more compelling discussions of scientific techniques. According
to one report, "[a]s more juries watch forensic-based crime programs like 'CSI'
on TV, lawyers also find the need to better explain to juries the realities and
limitations of forensic evidence."1" In sum, "[j]urors schooled in crime
investigations through watching TV dramas expect prosecutors to show them
sophisticated forensic evidence ...making it tough for the government to
prove cases. " "
This account is not universally accepted, and some have argued
passionately that the CSI effect is imaginary. As one commentary has
suggested:
To argue that "C.S.I." and similar shows are actually raising the
number of acquittals is a staggering claim, and the remarkable thing is
that, speaking forensically, there is not a shred of evidence to back it up.
There is a robust field of research on jury decision-making but no study
finding any "C.S.I. effect." 2
In other words, there is no direct research evidence that watching CSI has
changed juror standards of reasonable doubt.'3 And even "[p]rosecutors are
split as to whether there is a CSI Effect." 4
8. Karin H. Cather, The CSI Effect: Fake TV and Its Impact on Jurors in Criminal Cases,
PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 9, lo (quoting a prosecutor); see also News Release,
Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney, Maricopa County Attorney Confirms "CSI
Effect" Among Local Juries: Asks Network Executives To Use Disclaimer During Broadcasts
(June 30, 2005), http://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/Press/PDF/CSI.pdf. The latter
study is typical of "research" in this area in that it establishes the existence of the CSI effect
by asking prosecutors whether or not they have observed such an effect influencing jurors.
Because the prosecutors cannot step into the minds of jurors and are not conducting
experimental studies that vary exposure to CSI, their opinions are, basically, opinions.
9. See Smardz, supra note 5.
1o. Tom McCann, Criminal Lawyers Learn Latest in Forensic Sciences: NU Course Is Oldest CLE in
the Nation, CHI. LAw., Sept. 2005, at 20.
11. Martha Graybow, Prosecutors See 'CSI Effect' in White-Collar Cases, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2005,
available at http://www.redorbit.com/modules/news/tools.php?tool=print&id=250029.
12. Simon Cole & Rachel Dioso, Commentary, Law and the Lab, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at
W1 3.
13. Psychologists have discussed the complexity of defining the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. See Irwin A. Horowitz, Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Commonsense Justice and
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The lack of research on the CSI effect does not mean that its basic
premise - that media depictions of law shape jurors' judgments in real cases - is
new."5 For example, reacting to earlier television series such as The People's
Court, researchers argued in 1989 that the media distorted juror reactions to
real trials, with Judge Joseph A. Wapner's quick legal fixes purportedly leaving
real jurors frustrated by the realities of lengthy trials and their nuanced
decisions.'6 These early studies, however, focused on the influence of media
presentations of trial procedures rather than the investigatory process.
This Review assesses the CSI effect from a psychological perspective by
reviewing a series of studies of juror behavior. The aim is not to settle the
debate by presenting empirical evidence showing that the CSI effect does or
does not occur. Rather the goal is to show that the media's quick conclusion
that there is a CSI effect may be wrong. In so doing, this Review hypothesizes
other effects that CSI may have on jurors and evaluates alternate explanations
for the perceived increase in jury acquittals that has been attributed to the CSI
effect.
Part I argues that the existence of an effect linking CSI to juror judgments
is initially plausible and consistent with the findings of empirical research in
legal psychology. Part II disputes the conventional wisdom that exposure to
CSI raises jurors' standards for conviction. This Part suggests that it is equally
plausible that the CSI effect will be found to lower standards by creating a
mystification of scientific evidence, leading jurors to ignore or minimize the
limits in the data they see. Part III then identifies other plausible explanations
for increases in jury acquittals -if such increases have in fact occurred.
Standard of Proof, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 285 (1997); Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari
Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining "Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt," 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 769 (2000). This issue will not be addressed
here.
14. Cather, supra note 8, at 9. One interview led to this conclusion: "'Regarding the question of
the impact on juries resulting from forensic TV shows, we are seeing no impact,' says Elaine
Leschot, a supervising prosecutor in Monmouth, New Jersey, who oversees 18 trial lawyers
assigned to seven courts. 'Juries are returning verdicts based on evidence in court with the
same consistency seen before these shows began."' Id. at 9-1o.
is. See generally CRIMINAL VISIONS: MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Paul
Mason ed., 2003) (discussing how images of crime from the media shape social
constructions of reality).
16. See Wende Vyborney Dumble, And Justice for All: The Messages Behind "Real" Courtroom
Dramas, in TELEVISION STUDIES: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 103, 112 (Gary Burns & Robert J.
Thompson eds., 1989).
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I. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE CS1 EFFECT
Although there is not yet direct evidence on the CSI effect, research exists
on several related questions. By looking at these existing literatures, we can
begin to determine whether the CSI effect is at least plausible. Section A
suggests that juror judgments are influenced both by general exposure to
similar cases in the media and by pretrial publicity about the particular case at
issue. Section B suggests that people have difficulty putting aside these
influences even when asked to do so. This is especially important given that
studies of jury deliberations indicate that jurors often discuss legally irrelevant
information. Taken together, these findings indicate that future empirical
research may find that some kind of CSI effect exists.
A. Are People Influenced by the Mass Media?
If people's reactions to crime and criminals are generally shaped by the
mass media, then it seems reasonable to assume that public reactions to
criminal cases are shaped by shows like CSI. The psychological literature in
this area considers whether media exposure is generally important, as well as
whether pretrial publicity about a specific case or type of case shapes juror
judgments. Although this Review focuses on juror judgments specifically, most
media studies consider the influence of the mass media on broader issues, such
as fear of crime17 and perception of the seriousness of the crime problem.' 8 For
this reason, the following discussion focuses on one small subset of studies -
those on pretrial publicity -within the larger literature on the effects of the
mass media on the legal system.
Studies on the influence of pretrial publicity have focused on juror
judgments about particular defendants. In such studies, the simulated pretrial
publicity involves either giving jurors 9 information about the particular case
17. Linda Heath & Kevin Gilbert, Mass Media and Fear of Crime, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 379
(1996) (demonstrating that mass media reports about crime rate are linked to fear of crime).
18. SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS 16-33 (1987) (showing that
news stories that report on a social problem increased participants' judgments about the
seriousness of that problem).
19. While those involved in the studies were acting as jurors to make legal decisions, it is
important to remember that those involved knew that they were not involved in actual trials
and were not making real decisions. Further, in some studies the participants were college
students, who do not have the demographic characteristics of typical jurors. For these
reasons, it is important to view the findings with caution. See Nancy Mehrkins Steblay et al.,
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before them or exposing jurors to biasing information about a particular type
of crime, in the form of mass media reporting on that type of crime, before
they hear a specific case. In each of these scenarios, the basic proposition being
tested is whether prior biases will shape jurors' decisions.
One review of the literature in this area considered forty-four tests of
whether pretrial publicity shapes verdicts.2" It found that participants exposed
to negative pretrial publicity were significantly more likely to find a defendant
guilty than were those exposed to either positive pretrial publicity or no pretrial
publicity. This effect was stronger when studies were conducted on a
representative sample of potential jurors, rather than students, and when the
pretrial information involved was about the particular case or defendant, rather
than about the type of crime involved in a later trial." Overall, the literature
supports the argument that pretrial publicity shapes verdicts.2
A second generation of research in this area has focused on understanding
more precisely how pretrial publicity shapes verdicts." These studies directly
address the key concern underlying the discussion of the CSI effect in the
popular press -that media exposure shapes the threshold of reasonable doubt
and, through that mechanism, changes verdicts.
An experimental study by Margaret Bull Kovera directly addresses this
issue.' She found that media exposure to general information about rape
altered the standards that study participants used to determine guilt in a
particular rape case presented to them later. In one experiment, Kovera showed
undergraduates a videotaped news story on rape. The tape was edited to
present various perspectives on rape that were pro-defense for some subjects,
and pro-prosecution for others. Following their videotape viewing, the subjects
The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 219, 228 (1999).
20. Id. passim.
21. The occurrence of pretrial publicity effects in real trials is also supported by Christina A.
Studebaker et al., Studying Pretrial Publicity Effects: New Methods for Improving Ecological
Validity and TestingExternal Validity, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 19 (2002).
22. This conclusion is consistent with that of an earlier review. See Christina A. Studebaker &
Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 428 (1997). Recent research also extends this finding to civil cases. See Jennifer K.
Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting on Civil Litigation and Its
Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 5 (2003).
23. Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical and Legal Perspectives on the Impact of Pretrial Publicity: Effects
and Remedies, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2002).
24. Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of General Pretrial Publicity on Juror Decisions: An
Examination of Moderators and Mediating Mechanisms, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 43 (2002).
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were asked to list what evidence they would need to convict a defendant of
rape. The results indicated that prior exposure to the media presentation
altered the type of evidence that participants indicated they would find
plausible as an indicator of a defendant's guilt. Specifically, those who saw a
pro-defense video were less concerned about having evidence concerning
complainant credibility but required more inculpatory evidence to convict.2"
Watching CSI may have a similar effect. The investigators on CSI are the
heroes of the show and, as a rule, are deeply skeptical of civilians. Perhaps as a
result of the need to manufacture drama on a weekly basis, the show's plot
twists often involve apparent victims who turn out to be the actual killers,
alongside red herrings-those who confess despite their innocence, usually to
save another. The upshot of all this is that the investigators of CSI appear to
place next to no faith in the credibility of the ordinary people with whom they
talk. Rather than carefully weigh credibility, the investigators often seem to
ignore the problem of determining whether or not someone is lying by instead
going after "real" evidence, like microfibers.
An example of the difficulty of assessing credibility in the high-strung
world of CSI appears in the episode Harvest, in which the CSI crew encounters
the twisted Perez family. The family's twenty-year-old son, Daniel, is dying
from leukemia. His youngest sister, Alicia, disappears; the middle sister, April,
tells the investigators that little Alicia was abducted. But after Alicia's body is
found, scientific analysis shows that April must have been lying: Alicia was
dead before April claimed to have seen her kidnapped. Suspicion then falls on
the Perez parents, who-hospital records reveal -genetically engineered their
youngest daughter in order to harvest her body for organs, bone marrow, and
stem cells that would keep Daniel's leukemia at bay. Captain Brass, the gruff
leader of the group, grills Carlos Perez, the father, in the CSI investigation
room:
BRASS: I don't get you, man. I mean, even if you could explain it, I
would never understand how you could stuff your daughter in the
trunk of your car and dump her body in the woods!
CARLOS PEREZ: I had to protect my family.
BRASS: Wasn't Alicia part of your family? You're her father, you dumb
bastard! You're supposed to protect her. What kind of man are you?
25. Id. at 51-55.
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CARLOS PEREZ: Guilty.
But although Carlos Perez did dump Alicia's body-we know this because
fibers and footprints tie him to the crime scene-the real killer is Daniel, who
ground poison into Alicia's milk to put her out of her misery.26
In a second study conducted by Kovera, participants were again exposed
to news stories with differing perspectives about rape. Participants then
watched a videotaped simulation of an acquaintance rape trial and completed a
questionnaire. As in study one, the goal was to examine whether pretrial
publicity altered the standards used by jurors to judge a defendant's guilt. The
study found that prior publicity affected the salience of judgments about the
defendant's credibility.27 Kovera found that the news stories showed to the
participants -whether they were pro-victim or pro-defendant- increased the
predictive power of the defendant's credibility on the outcome of the case." As
in Kovera's first study, prior media exposure shaped the manner in which
participants thought about a particular subsequent case.29 In this study, a more
complex pattern of results emerged, showing interaction effects with subjects'
prior attitudes about rape.3" Nevertheless, the nature of the prior media
exposure changed the way that participants reasoned as they reached their
verdict in the case.31
26. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Harvest (CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 2004) (transcript
available at http ://twiztv.com/scripts/csi/season5/csi-5o3.txt).
27. Kovera, supra note 24, at 55-67.
z8. Id. at 67.
29. These studies are not direct analogues of real world situations. For example, they typically
expose people to media stories shortly before their trial decisions, while in reality there may
be considerable time delays.
30. Kovera, supra note 24, at 65-66.
31. In examining the literature on pretrial publicity, the goal has been to determine whether or
not media exposure shapes subsequent verdicts. The literature suggests that it does. Fulero
summarized: "Pretrial publicity has damaging effects on potential jurors; jurors exposed to
pretrial publicity render guilty verdicts more often than those not so exposed. This has been
found both with simulated jurors, and in real cases." Solomon M. Fulero, Aftenvord: The
Past, Present, and Future of Applied Pretrial Publicity Research, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 127
(2002) (citations omitted). Although this effect is widely found, the argument that it occurs
because jurors change their standards of guilt is supported by a much smaller body of
research.
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These studies suffer from the limitations of the experimental approach and
may not reflect the complexity or richness of real trials."2 Significantly,
however, psychologists have recently had the opportunity to observe actual
jury deliberations in both criminal and civil cases in various jurisdictions. This
has allowed them to examine directly whether jurors discuss forbidden
topics -such as the sort of outside information reflected in the media -when
making their decisions. Their findings suggest that jurors do bring information
from outside the trial into their deliberations.3 As an example, although rules
of evidence preclude the introduction of evidence about insurance, one study
found that eighty-five percent of juries discussed the issue of insurance and its
impact on the outcome) 4 Although such information is not the primary factor
shaping juror decisions, it does have a discernable influence.
B. Can People Put Aside Their Preconceptions?
Preconceptions are only a problem if jurors are unable to set them aside.3" A
second literature examines this capacity. If jurors can clear their minds, then
the biasing influences of watching CSI could be counteracted merely by a judge
urging jurors to set aside any information they had learned from watching
crime shows on television.
Psychologists have studied jurors' ability to disregard information by
evaluating their reactions to inadmissible evidence. When a judge tells a jury,
for example, that it should "disregard the witness's last statement," she is
relying upon an ability to compartmentalize information to keep it from
influencing judgments. The degree to which jurors are able to do this speaks to
the consciousness of decisionmaking. If decisions are influenced by factors that
people are not aware of, or if jurors cannot control the influence of different
factors on their judgments, then decisionmaking is outside of conscious
control. If that is the case, then jurors cannot put aside information simply
because they are asked to do so by a judge.
32. Neil Vidmar, for example, has identified four types of prejudice that are important in actual
civil and criminal trials. See Neil Vidmar, Case Studies of Pre- and Midtrial Prejudice in
Criminal and Civil Litigation, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 75-82 (2002).
33. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87
VA. L. REv. 1857, 1866-1904 (2001).
34. Id. at 1876.
35. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 81, 91-92.
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Studies by psychologists have repeatedly shown that admonitions to
disregard inadmissible evidence are ineffective. 6  In one such study,
participants were exposed to pretrial publicity that was either damaging to the
defendant or irrelevant. The damaging publicity was found to increase the
perceived strength of the prosecution case and the likelihood of a guilty verdict.
The effect was the same when participants were admonished to ignore the
pretrial publicity.17 A later study obtained similar results." While admonitions
to ignore the evidence have not been found to be effective, one study did
conclude that if suspicion is cast on the motivation of the source of the
information, inadmissible information has less impact.3 9
Some studies have found that calling attention to inadmissible evidence
actually increases the influence that evidence has on jurors. This effect might
occur because jurors resent having their impartiality called into question, or it
may be that making a particular type of information the focus of attention
heightens its role in decisionmaking. Like the CSI effect itself, this argument
suggests that when an issue - such as the probative value of evidence - is made
salient, the importance of that issue in decisionmaking is increased.
It is not clear whether these effects reflect jurors affirmatively disobeying
instructions or merely being unable to set aside personal biases. This
distinction is important because if jurors are capable of ignoring inadmissible
evidence but simply choose not to, then more effective jury instructions could
correct these biases. But if the use of outside influences is reflexive and
unconscious, then juror training would require new advances in psychological
control. In the latter case, the simplest solution would be to attempt to shield
potential jurors from exposure to inadmissible information in the first place.
Research in this area also shows that the verdicts of jurors who claim to be
unbiased during voir dire are still influenced by prior bias.4 ° In fact, asking
jurors about particular views prior to trial is sometimes found to increase the
36. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y&L. 677, 684-85 (2000).
37. Stanley Sue et al., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 163
(1974).
38. Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 409 (1990).
39. Steven Fein et al., Can the Jury Disregard that Information?, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1215 (1997).
40. See Stanley Sue et al., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity, and Awareness of Bias in Simulated
Jurors, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299 (1975).
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influence of related pretrial publicity. 4' Although none of these studies has
specifically addressed CSI, this literature calls into question a supposed
prosecutorial strategy for overcoming the CSI effect: quizzing jurors about
whether they watch CSI and whether it might bias their decisionmaking.
Along with the jury, the other relevant decisionmaker in legal settings is the
judge. It is equally important, therefore, to ask if judges can put aside
inadmissible information. This issue has been addressed recently in a series of
scenario studies using judges as the participants. 42 The studies found that
judges had difficulty disregarding a variety of types of inadmissible evidence.
While "judges displayed a surprising ability to [ignore inadmissible evidence]
in some situations," including failures to provide defendants with appropriate
counsel or to follow appropriate legal procedures, they were influenced by
evidence such as the sexual history of a person in a rape trial. 43 The fact that
judges can ignore irrelevant information when they desire suggests that when
judges do not ignore inadmissible information, the reason is that they choose
not to. Or it may be that the information is so salient in certain situations that
judges find themselves unable to ignore it.
From the perspective of the CSI effect, these research findings on
inadmissible evidence reinforce those already outlined in the discussion of
pretrial publicity. They suggest that the influence of viewing mass media
depictions of the criminal and civil justice systems on later decisionmaking
during trials may persist even when the legal system makes efforts to limit that
influence, either by questioning potential jurors prior to the trial or by
admonishing jurors not to take account of these influences when making
decisions.
The most salient feature of CSI is that it is a fictional depiction of crime.
The mass media literature has argued that people generally have difficulty
distinguishing between various aspects of the mass media, often confusing
entertainment, news, and commercials. 44 More specifically, people fail to
discount fictional dramatizations of crime when making legal judgments. 41
41. See Steblay et al., supra note 19, at 224 tbl.2.
42. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
43. Id. at 1251-52.
44. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN
ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION (L.J. Shrum ed., 2003).
45. See AARON DOYLE, ARRESTING IMAGES: CRIME AND POLICING IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION
CAMERA (2003).
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This is not unique to mass media presentations, because people generally have
a problem correctly recalling the source of a particular piece of information.4
6
Still, the implication is clear: Fictional depictions of crime and the criminal
justice process can and do spill over to shape public views about the nature of
crime and criminals.
II. OTHER POSSIBLE CSI EFFECTS
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the claim that watching
programs such as CSI affects juror decisionmaking, potentially by altering
standards of reasonable doubt. But the existing research does not provide a
framework for understanding this effect, or for understanding how the CSI
effect interacts with the other potential influences of mass media.
This Part suggests that it is equally plausible to hypothesize the opposite of
the CSI effect-that is, that CSI potentially lowers the standards used by
jurors, making conviction more likely, rather than less. The argument is that
jurors want to resolve the tensions associated with an uncorrected injustice,
and that tension is best resolved by a conviction. Thus, jurors are motivated to
search for and find arguments that will legitimate their desires to convict. We
know that jurors overweigh the probative value of science, putting greater
weight on such evidence than its statistical value warrants. CSI's presentation
of science encourages this mystification and may, therefore, lead juries to
accord inflated probative value to the evidence they see in trials. Jurors would
then rely on that evidence to justify convictions.
In cases not involving scientific evidence, it may be more difficult for jurors
to justify their motivation to convict. Justification requires both the desire to
justify and the availability of some plausible and legitimate reason for making
the desired decision. The credibility of scientific evidence is one such
legitimating tool, but it is not the only possible way to justify a decision. As an
example, jurors may enhance the perceived credibility of eyewitness testimony
as a way of justifying a conviction.
46. Psychologists have identified source confusion as an issue whenever people are making
judgments about complex events, with people having difficulty correctly remembering
where information was originally experienced. For a discussion of this issue, see Karen J.
Mitchell & Marcia K. Johnson, Source Monitoring: Attributing Mental Experiences, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 179 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000).
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A. Promoting the Need for Closure
In modem societies, the responsibility for restoring the moral balance
following rule-breaking rests with the state, because the state claims a
monopoly on the use of coercion. But the legal system must confront two
interrelated objectives: truth and justice. Truth is a prerequisite for justice;
without knowing the facts of the case it is impossible to determine whether
justice has been done. The search for truth involves both identifying the guilty
party and determining what actually happened so that the appropriate level of
punishment can occur.
When it is uncertain or unknown who has caused harm, people seek the
closure that comes from seeing the guilty party identified and punished, but
they lack the ability to take actions that satisfy this desire. This frustration is
most palpable when perpetrators are never identified, but even lingering
doubts about whether justice has been served trigger this sentiment. In reality,
truth is seldom certain. As recent high-profile criminal trials make clear, the
evidence available at trial can rarely put to rest all doubt as to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant. Smoking guns are typically elusive at trials, which
are more often characterized by collections of contradictory assertions and
fallible evidence. We can never know for certain whether O.J. Simpson, Robert
Blake, and Scott Peterson killed their wives, whether Michael Jackson molested
children, or whether Martha Stewart and Kenneth Lay deliberately deceived
others. This uncertainty about the truth makes it more difficult to achieve
justice in a psychologically satisfactory manner.47 Both decisionmakers and the
general public are left with a sense of unease and lack of completeness, as
crimes are unsolved and uncertainty remains .41
In terms of resolving uncertainty, then, guilty and not-guilty verdicts are
not equivalent. A guilty verdict identifies someone responsible for a crime and
provides a sense of psychological completeness and closure. A not-guilty
verdict prevents an injustice to a potentially innocent person but does nothing
to resolve the psychological desire to see justice done, either for the victim or
the population at large. Finally, irrespective of the verdict they render, jurors
often remain uncertain about their decision, leaving any verdict shrouded in a
mist of doubt.
47. Neil Vidmar & Dale T. Miller, Socialpsychological Processes Underlying Attitudes Toward Legal
Punishment, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 565, 581 (198o).
48. See Robert Hogan & Nicholas P. Emler, Retributive Justice, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 125, 135-36 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981).
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The popularity of CSI lies in its ability to simplify the messy uncertainties
of real-world crime. CSJ's plots are consistent with the strong psychological
need to achieve closure following the commission of a crime. Indeed, CSI
occasionally dramatizes the crimes that captivate Americans. In an episode of
CSI: Miami, the plot closely traced the real-life story of Natalee Holloway, an
American teenager who disappeared on a trip to Aruba.49 Although the
Holloway case has been characterized by public frustration over the inability to
find out what happened, the CSI: Miami forensic team was able to crack the
case with conclusive evidence by the end of the hour. When the body of the
victim was found, a sperm sample led investigators to her attacker."0
Identifying the assailant and seeing him punished is psychologically
reassuring, and a drama that raises tension with crime and relieves that tension
with inevitable apprehension and punishment fills important psychological
needs for its viewers. Media studies show empirically that the enjoyment of
audiences watching a fictional portrayal of a crime is linked to the degree to
which they see appropriate moral sanctions being delivered to wrongdoers."1
This presentation creates and then dispels the tension associated with the
threat to the social order and community values that is created by
wrongdoing.s2 By seeing the wrongdoer identified and punished, the
community is reassured that those who commit wrongs and are deserving of
punishment get their just deserts.5 3
The best evidence that people have a psychological need to see a completed
cycle of punishment following the commission of a crime is provided by recent
research on how people feel after viewing crime. One study, for example,
stimulated anger among experimental participants by showing video clips of a
crime. 4 The video clip was of an act of senseless wrongdoing -a man beating
up a helpless teenager. Those who watched the video clip were then given one
of three possible outcomes. They were told either that (1) the man was
49. See, e.g., Amy Gunderson, Disappearance Still Weighs on Aruba's Tourism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, § 5, at 14.
so. CSI: Miami: Prey (CBS television broadcast Oct. 3, 2005).
Si. See Arthur A. Raney, Punishing Media Criminals and Moral Judgment: The Impact on
Enjoyment, 7 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 145 (2005).
52. See DOLF ZILLMANN & PETER VORDERER, MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ITS
APPAiL (2000) (discussing the psychological appeal of various types of entertainment).
53. Hogan & Emler, supra note 48; see also TOM R, TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE
SOCIETY 103-32 (1997) (discussing the psychological need to see rule-breakers punished).
54. Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 784 (1999).
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punished; (2) the man escaped punishment; or (3) no information on the
man's fate was known. The study showed that people who did not have the
psychological sense of completion associated with being told the man was
punished would still feel anger and would carry that anger forward to a
seemingly unrelated task.
In this study, the seemingly unrelated task was reading about cases
depicting acts of negligence or recklessness and being asked to assess
responsibility, blame, and punishment. The analysis indicated that when
participants felt anger over the previously viewed injustice, and when they
lacked the psychological completeness of knowing that the original harmdoer
was punished, they were more punitive after reading the subsequent vignettes
and punished the subsequent wrongdoers more harshly. This carryover effect
did not occur when participants were told that the initial perpetrator was
punished or when his fate was ambiguous."s
No effect was observed among the participants whose anger was not
aroused by the original incident. As we would anticipate, however, that group
was quite small. This is consistent with the argument that people are upset
when wrongdoing is unaccompanied by punishment of the wrongdoer, and
they therefore seek the psychological satisfaction of seeing the offender
punished.
Psychologists argue that there is a fundamental human motivation to see
justice done, referred to as "the belief in a just world. '', 6 Put simply, people
need to believe that the world is a just place in which individuals get what they
deserve, and so they respond to wrongs by doing everything they can to
procure an appropriate remedy. If this hypothesis is correct, it is particularly
significant for our understanding of the CSI effect. Just as CSI is popular, at
least in part, because it satisfies our longing to see justice prevail in social
relations, these instincts may motivate jurors to try to resolve the cases before
them by identifying the perpetrator and bringing him to justice. Achieving the
finality of conviction is surely the most psychologically satisfying resolution
because an acquittal leaves the crime unsolved? 7 While there is a cognitive
55. Because those who receive no information about the fate of the perpetrator also lack
completion, it is unclear why they do not show this effect. It seems likely that being directly
confronted with an unpunished wrongdoer is the most upsetting condition, as injustice is
then highly salient.
S6. MELVINJ. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD (1980).
s. CSI further satisfies the desire of viewers for psychological reassurance by using flashbacks
that show them the actual commission of the crime, presented in an altered visual frame.
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motivation to acquit the innocent, the emotional need to achieve justice for the
victim is incomplete until someone is identified and punished for the crime."8
As portrayed by the media, the CSI effect causes jurors to maintain high
standards for assessing reasonable doubt. From a psychological perspective,
this reasoning is suspect because it runs contrary to the motivation that leads
people to watch CSI- the desire to see enactments of certain truth and justice.
Fiction, like CSI, is reassuring because it takes viewers to a place where wrongs
are righted and those who break rules are punished. But if viewers respond to
this stimulus by raising the bar and acquitting the wrongdoers, then reality
fails to match fiction. There is no closure, no feeling that justice has been
restored.
The desire for retribution following wrongdoing is the oldest form of
justice and is central to all societies. In his examination of justice, Neil Vidmar
commented: "Retribution and revenge, two highly related concepts, are
arguably the oldest, most basic, and most pervasive justice reactions associated
with human social life." 9 Why is the desire to punish so strong? When
someone breaks social rules, he undermines the established social and moral
order. His actions both cause injury and lower the status of victims, and social
mechanisms are needed to reestablish that order. One such mechanism is
punishment of the wrongdoer, which both lowers his status and restores that
of the victim. Without such punishment, the victim, her family, and others in
the community do not feel that the social world has been put right, thereby
perpetuating social consequences of the crime.6"
Because of the strong psychological need to punish wrongdoing, the typical
problem that societies face is the lowering of standards of truth in the interest
of achieving justice. People are often found to suspend the normal factfinding
process associated with punishing wrongdoers-the process of clearly
identifying the perpetrator of the harm. Vigilante mobs and kangaroo courts
rush to satisfy the desire to punish, ignoring the legal procedures for
establishing the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. When the desire to
punish is sufficiently strong, standards of truth are compromised and may even
be completely ignored. The strength of this desire is reflected both in the
Unlike real investigators, jurors, and judges, viewers actually see the crime occur. They have
no uncertainty about what happened or about who is actually guilty.
S8. See Carolyn L. Hafer & Laurent B6gue, Experimental Research on Just-World Theory:
Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges, 131 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 128, 130 (2005).
5g. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 31 (Joseph
Sanders &V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
60. There is a large legal literature on the desire to punish. See id. at 54-56.
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lengths to which people are willing to go to find those they view as responsible
for wrongdoing and in the severity of the punishments they often mete out to
them.
The actions of vigilante mobs point to a fundamental truth about human
nature: The desire to punish, and to restore the status of victims and the
legitimacy of rules, is frustrated by the uncertainty that often exists about who
is responsible for harm. Furthermore, when that frustration is strong, the
search for truth suffers. Those emotionally enraged by a crime seek a way to
resolve their feelings, and they may do so by lowering their standards of proof
out of a need to have a person to hold responsible and punish for a crime.6
In other words, if people are motivated by watching CSI to hold higher
standards of reasonable doubt, this outcome would fly in the face of the
typically strong desire to see wrongdoers punished.
B. Overbelief in the Probative Value of Evidence
Might CSI motivate jurors to exaggerate the probative value of the
scientific evidence presented to them? There is widespread evidence indicating
that people already overestimate the probative value of scientific evidence.
Given the general lack of connection between actual and perceived probative
value, it is not difficult to imagine that perceived probative value shifts in
response to jurors' psychological desires and needs. The effect may be
unconscious.
Psychologists writing about scientific evidence in trials make the point that
the existence of error itself is not necessarily a problem, because factfinders -
whether the jury or the judge -can adjust for it when they make decisions. For
example, a witness testifies that he recognizes the offender as the person who
robbed him at gunpoint. Through skillful cross-examination, the lawyer for
the defense may establish that it was dark in the alley and that the witness was
drunk, nearsighted, and not wearing his glasses.62 All of these factors speak to
the accuracy of the witness, and it is assumed that the factfinder discounts the
61. For a discussion of retributive justice, see TYLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 103-32.
62. For examples of problems with eyewitness identification, see BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How To MAKE IT RIGHT 53-100 (New Am.
Library, rev. ed. 2003) (2000).
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testimony to the extent of its doubted validity.6' Hence, in theory, the legal
system takes account of unreliability.
The problem with this method of managing uncertainty in legal settings
arises when judges or juries are unable to properly assess the validity of
evidence. This failing is widely recognized in studies of eyewitness
identification, in which psychologists have established that jurors overestimate
the accuracy of eyewitness identification. For example, in one study, John
Brigham and Robert Bothwell described crime settings to potential jurors and
asked them how likely it was that others could accurately identify a criminal
they viewed in a lineup.64 Over two scenarios, the Brigham and Bothwell
subjects predicted that the correct suspects would be identified 63.5% of the
time. However, in the original studies in which subjects performed this
identification task, the true accuracy rate was a meager 25.4%.65 This illustrates
the general tendency to view evidence as more probative than it actually is; it
reveals the occurrence of overbelief.66 Overbelief facilitates the ability to act on
the desire to convict by providing plausible evidence of guilt and thus
legitimates a guilty verdict.
The conditions under which this general overbelief effect is strong and
weak, outlined by Gary Wells and Elizabeth Olson, are also consistent with the
argument presented here. Overbelief is most likely to be found when
eyewitnesses are more likely to be inaccurate. Similarly, the motivation to
distort evidence and create confidence in one's verdict would be strongest
when jurors are faced with weak evidence such as an eyewitness with low
credibility. If the jurors want to convict and have strong evidence, they face no
psychological conflict. However, if they want to convict but the evidence is
weak, they are motivated to distort the evidence by seeing it as more probative
than it actually is. And, it is in fact when evidence is weak that the overbelief
effect is found.
63. But see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (limiting the presentation
of expert witness testimony to juries when the reliability of the expert's testimony cannot be
confirmed).
64. John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors To Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983).
6S. Id. at 25 fig.I.
66. See also Gary L. Wells, How Adequate Is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 256 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984). For a
discussion of refinements on and limitations of research into eyewitness testimony, see Gary
L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCi-OL. 277 (2003).
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The fact that people do overestimate the probative value of scientific
evidence does not, in and of itself, show that they are motivated to distort the
probative value of evidence. However, the finding that people overestimate the
accuracy of evidence is consistent with the psychological argument that
people's reaction to harm and the need to resolve harm are motivated, in part,
by their desire to see justice done. In order to fulfill their need for certainty and
closure, people need to be comfortable that they have identified the guilty party
and that he has been appropriately punished.
If people were simply poor at assessing the true state of the world, we
would expect many mistaken estimates - some overestimates and some
underestimates. Instead we see a consistent tendency to overestimate accuracy.
This is true not only with eyewitness identification. Jurors also overestimate
other types of scientific evidence, ranging from the accuracy of lie detector
evidence and the "repressed" memories of childhood abuse recalled by adults.
This consistent pattern of overestimation suggests that people are not just bad
at evaluating evidence but rather are motivated to see evidence as probative.
This may reflect either conscious or unconscious mental processes.
It follows that when people are more highly motivated to resolve a crime
and provide justice for the victim, they will also be more highly motivated to
overestimate the probative value of the evidence. The desire to legitimate a
desired verdict will vary depending upon the situation. When the motivation
to legitimate a verdict is present, however, one way to effectively justify the
verdict is to view the evidence as strong. The motivation to believe more
strongly in the probative value of the evidence can be combined with the
lowering of the threshold for conviction. Studies of the willingness to convict
in death penalty cases, which will be discussed later in this Review, provide
direct evidence of such a lowering.6 7 And, of course, Section L.A described how
pretrial publicity can lead to the lowering of standards. Here, the key argument
is that jurors can also legitimate their verdict by raising their assessment of the
quality of the evidence.
How does this connect to CSI? The general message of CSI is that scientific
methods and evidence are legitimate and reliable. In one episode, for example,
investigators perform a remarkable "reverse algorithm and enhancement" of an
audiotaped ransom demand. Using a spectrograph to match the sound waves
from the ransom recording to those from a different voice recording, they are
able to conclusively identify the kidnapper. By isolating sound on the same
tape, they are also able to determine that the victim herself was involved in
67. See infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
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staging her own kidnapping.68 If our forensic scientists can tell that much from
a single tape, what can't they do? Thus, whereas media reports argue that CSI
standards make real trial evidence look bad, it is also possible that the portrayal
of science as the ultimate crime-fighting tool actually encourages the already
existing overbelief in the value of the flawed scientific findings that jurors
confront in actual trials.6" People are already motivated to find ways to
legitimate or justify their desire to convict.70 Science provides one way to do so,
causing people to see within scientific evidence the level of certainty that makes
them comfortable with a guilty verdict. Here, it is the credibility of science that
is crucial, because jurors seek a form of justification that is plausible and
compelling to bolster their own desire for certainty.
Surveys demonstrate that science can be particularly effective in
legitimating legal outcomes. Consider the results of the 1998 General Social
Survey, a national sample conducted by the National Opinion Research Center.
In that survey, nineteen percent of Americans expressed at least "a great deal of
confidence" in courts and the legal system; 71 ten percent expressed a great deal
of confidence in the people running television;72 and nine percent expressed a
great deal of confidence in the people running the press.73 In this case, neither
68. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Crate 'n Burial (CBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2000)
(transcript available at http://twiztv.com/scripts/csVseasoni/csi-1o3.txt).
69. There has recently been a great deal of attention directed at the problems associated with the
type of scientific evidence that has traditionally had the aura of infallibility, including
fingerprints and DNA. For an example of a recent study that casts doubt on the reliability of
fingerprint comparisons, see Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005). For DNA evidence
studies, see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND THE LAW: 2001 AND
2002 NATIONAL CONFERENCES 28 (2004); and Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the
Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 859 (1996).
70. Psychologists have established that people are more likely to engage in distortions when
they have a compelling justification that they can invoke to justify such distortions. For a
review of the literature on psychological rationalization, see TYLER ET AL., supra note 53, at
135-52.
71. See Nat'l Opinion Res. Ctr., Codebook Variable: CONCOURT, http://webapp.
icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/rnd1998/merged/cdbk/concourt.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2005). In the
1988-1991 study, twenty-four percent expressed at least a great deal of confidence in the
courts and the legal system. Id.
72. See Nat'l Opinion Res. Ctr., Codebook Variable: CONTV, http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/
GSS/md1998/merged/cdbk/contv.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
73. See Nat'l Opinion Res. Ctr., Codebook Variable: CONPRESS, http://webapp.
icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/rnd1998/merged/cdbk/conpress.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
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the legal system nor television is an institution in which the public places
generally high confidence. However, the same study found that forty percent of
Americans expressed a great deal of confidence in the scientific community. 74
The linkage of evidence to science, then, enhances verdict legitimacy. Although
people could legitimate their conclusions in any number of ways, viewing
scientific evidence as conclusive is an obvious approach. CSI fosters this aura
by encouraging a myth of forensic and scientific infallibility.75
The effort to validate legal decisions by reference to science and the
rationality of scientific processes is not new. The use of quantification and
scientific methodology to provide support for the decisions of all types of
societal authorities reflects the desire to cast the aura of certainty onto arenas in
which decisions are often made in highly subjective ways. 76 In a trial, for
example, the "true" innocence of the defendant is typically unknown, so the
legitimacy of the verdict can be established by evidence that compellingly
reveals the truth, as when DNA tests are used to exonerate those wrongly
accused or convicted of crimes.' This need to legitimate the outcome should be
stronger when people are highly motivated to resolve a crime and hold a
criminal responsible.
An example of this process can be found in research on the death penalty.
In capital cases, only those who might be willing to vote for the death penalty
during the penalty phase of the trial are allowed to sit on a jury for the guilt-
determination phase .7 Studies comparing two groups - those "death qualified"
and those excluded by this standard -indicate that those who are willing to
vote for the death penalty have a lower threshold of evidence required to vote
74. See Nat'l Opinion Res. Ctr., Codebook Variable: CONSCI, http://webapp.
icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/rnd1998/merged/cdbk/consci.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
7S. In addition, the investigators on CSI always "get their man," which may foster an image of
prosecutorial infallibility as well.
76. See ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE MEASURE OF REALITY: QANTIFICATION AND WESTERN
SOCIETY, 1250-16oo (1997) (reviewing the history of efforts to quantify evidence in Western
science and society); Robyn Stryker, Legitimacy Processes as Institutional Politics: Implications
for Theology and Research in the Sociology of Organizations, in ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS 179
(Samuel B. Bacharach & Edward J. Lawler eds., 2000); Robin Stryker, Rules, Resources, and
Legitimacy Processes, 99 Am. J. Soc. 847 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on
Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming Oct. 2006).
7. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 62. But see supra note 69 (discussing the limitations of DNA
and fingerprint evidence).
78. For a discussion of death qualification as a legal procedure, see Claudia L. Cowan et al., The
Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition To Convict and on the Qyality of
Deliberations, 8 LAw &HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984).
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for conviction at the guilt-determination phase. This is true even though both
groups evaluate the probative value of particular evidence in the same way (i.e.,
they view the same evidence as establishing an equal likelihood that the person
on trial actually committed the crime).79 This suggests that prior attitudes or
personality characteristics associated with support for the death penalty
motivate jurors to want to resolve a crime and hold a criminal responsible.
These jurors do so by having lower standards of what evidence is required to
justify a verdict of guilty.
C. Creating a One-Sided View of the Law
CSI also potentially assists prosecutors by showing only the investigation
and leaving the impression that the trial is a mere formality. Just as in its
historical predecessors - Sherlock Holmes,s ° The Thin Man s" and Perry Mason,8
to name a few- the story ends in CSI when the investigator solves the mystery.
The ultimate deliverance of justice is left as a foregone conclusion.
8,
79. See id.
8o. One of the most famous such mysteries is ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Hound of the
Baskervilles, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 781 (Doubleday & Co. 1953)
(1902). The scientific acuity and refined deductive reasoning of Detective Holmes were key
features of these books. In many respects, these mysteries are consistent with CSI- both use
refined logic and advanced forensics to solve seemingly perfect crimes.
81. DASHiELL HI- mETTr, THE THIN MAN (1934). In The Thin Man series, a detective and his
wife solve crimes using clever reasoning and effective interrogation. The novels were later
made into films, including THE THIN MAN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1934).
82. Perry Mason (CBS television broadcasts 1957-1966). No episode of Perry Mason was
complete without a dramatic revelation:
Mason doesn't get his client acquitted by showing that the prosecutor failed to
carry the burden of proof. Instead, he proves his client's innocence by exposing
the real killer. Surprise witnesses appear at the last minute, just before it is too
late. After Mason's cross-examination, prosecution witnesses break down on the
stand. As far as we can tell, Mason has never represented a guilty client or
engaged in plea bargaining.
Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 185, 198 (1987).
83. A rare episode that shows a jury deliberating demonstrates how the CSI effect might work.
In CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Eleven Angry Jurors (CBS television broadcast Jan. 8, 2004)
(transcript available at http://twiztv.com/scripts/csi/season4/csi-411.txt), the episode opens
on a jury room in which the frustrated jurors have been sequestered for nearly three weeks.
Not surprisingly, the jurors are deliberating in a murder trial. Eleven jurors are set to convict
the victim's husband on the strength of forensic evidence: His "fingerprints were all over"
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In terms of psychological closure, conviction is critical. The satisfaction of
knowing the criminal received his just deserts - and retributive justice has been
achieved -is essential. CSI skirts the complications of achieving this end by
only rarely bringing cases to trial. In fact, when confronted with the undeniable
proof of their guilt, many CSI perpetrators confess, filling in any missing
details . 4 And because there is no uncertainty about who is guilty, there is no
need for a trial. In the real world, however, finding the perpetrator is just one
step of a long process. If one man has killed another, this does not end the
inquiry. He could be guilty of first-degree murder, but the "heat of passion,"
mental illness, or any number of mitigating or excusing factors would be
considered in an actual trial. By focusing almost exclusively on the
investigation, CSI leads its viewers to believe that finding the assailant is the
only thing that matters. s
the belt used to strangle her. A lone holdout insists that "the burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt," and maintains that the real killer was the cable guy, who has "priors"
and has "skipped town." None of the others buy the holdout's story. In the words of
another juror, the cable guy's "fingerprints weren't even on the belt." The jury never reaches
a verdict- the holdout is found dead on the jury room floor, and CSI is brought in to
discover whether one of the others killed him.
84. For example, in the episode Crate 'n Burial, a woman who staged her own kidnapping
confesses to the crime when faced with the investigators' audio tape algorithms. CSI: Crime
Scene Investigation: Crate 'n Burial, supra note 68.
85. Although the show does a fairly good job of following the basics of criminal procedure,
there is no attempt to paint courts, attorneys, or even prosecutors in a fair or balanced light.
The message of CSI is clear: The legal system is an obstacle and a frustration to the
investigators' search for truth. For example, in CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Coming of
Rage (CBS television broadcast Dec. 18, 2003) (transcript available at
http://twiztv.com/scripts/csi/season4/csi-41o.txt), the team of investigators goes to a high
school to investigate the possibility that a teenage boy who was beaten to death was killed
by his classmates. Students are gathered in the gym, and the father of one child-who is an
attorney-raises the issue of whether the meeting constitutes unjustified detention. He is
portrayed as a strident, over-aggressive jerk who wants to set a child's killer free:
TYLER'S DAD: You are sequestering these kids without probable cause. I hate
that I've been called out of work to come down here, and I'm going to be so far up
your ass, you're not going to be able to sit down straight.
GRISSOM: You know what I hate? People who hurt kids. And you know who
those people sometimes are?
TYLER'S DAD: Cops?
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This bias has the potential to disturb the tenuous balance of justice. Jurors
must grapple with two types of justice: justice for the victim and justice for the
defendant. A trial often makes these targets appear mutually exclusive. There is
no justice for the victim until the perpetrator has been identified and convicted.
But justice for the defendant requires dedication to the truth and full
consideration of the defendant's mental state and the circumstances of any
actions he may have taken.
But through whose eyes does the jury see a case - the victim's or the
defendant's? Whose justice does the jury emphasize? This will depend on the
circumstances of the case. Defense counsel strives to make the humanity of her
client salient to the jury, while the prosecutor works to make the victim appear
sympathetic. The two parties battle over credibility and sympathy. The defense
counsel tries to parlay doubts about the victim's honesty and a lack of
sympathy for the victim's plight into greater sympathy for the defendant. In
such a case, the jury is likely focused on protecting the defendant rather than
the victim.
The jury's focus on justice for the victim can be manifested in two possible
ways. First, jurors might lower their standards for what constitutes sufficient
evidence to reach a guilty verdict. As discussed above, in the aftermath of
particularly vicious crimes, communities often lower their standards of guilt
and rapidly find someone to hold responsible for a crime. One reason that the
state acts as arbiter of legal claims is to build a framework of rationality around
reactions to rule-breaking that could preclude the application of reasonable
standards of right and wrong. The state, however, is subject to the standard-
lowering impulse as well. Prosecutors, for example, work particularly
vigorously to punish criminals when a particular type of crime is viewed as out
of control in the community. As the result, unfortunate citizens who commit a
crime widely committed in the community may suddenly find themselves
subject to intensive state prosecution. Recently, corporate leaders have been
targeted for behaviors that, if not legal, were widespread within the business
community."
Second, jurors might keep the same standard but raise their estimates of
the quality of the evidence that is put forward by the state. Those jurors who
GRISSOM: Other kids. If it had been your son whose skull was smashed in with
a hammer, you'd be asking me where I was when I should've been protecting
him. Kids bring guns to school to shoot other kids, so who are you protecting?
86. For a discussion of corporate misconduct, see Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy
Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005).
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want a victim to be vindicated may respond by perceiving the evidence as
'stronger. Similarly, the state, eager to find its scapegoat, may be motivated to
pursue a weaker case by overestimating the evidence.
By focusing on investigations, rather than trials, CSI understates the
importance of both defenses and justifications, reinforcing the focus on the
victim rather than the defendant. If the focus were on the trial, we might hear
about the defendant's lousy childhood, her temporary insanity, or her sincere
remorse. In a real courtroom, these factors force us to address what is just for
the defendant. The focus on investigation, however, draws attention to the
victim of the crime.
It bears mentioning that it doesn't have to be this way. Another popular
crime drama, Law & Order, depicts both investigations and trials. On Law &
Order, the evidence is not presented as conclusive to the same degree, and there
is uncertainty about the outcome of the trial. Further, potential defenses are
dramatized. Hence, while the show certainly does not depict the workings of
the legal system with complete accuracy, Law & Order presents a more realistic
picture than CSI in at least two ways: It emphasizes uncertainty about the truth
and shows the trial as both a search for truth and an arena in which justice -
both for the victim and for the defendant -is at issue. This often brings a
criminal's state of mind into play. In short, Law & Order questions whether a
person is factually guilty as well as what legal responsibility she bears. The
popularitys7 of Law & Order suggests that audiences can grapple with criminal
justice issues in a more complete way.
III. DOES THE CS1 EFFECT EXIST?
Proponents of the CSI effect theorize that fictional depictions of forensic
science lead jurors to impose higher standards of proof, resulting in more
frequent acquittals. But changes in juror behavior may also reflect other
factors, such as sympathy for defendants, changing views of the evidence
quality, or increased mistrust of the government and the law.
To begin, we must note that the premise of the CSI effect -increasing
leniency-may itself be overstated or nonexistent. In earlier eras, claims of
increased juror leniency prompted research that found no evidence of any such
increase.88 But let us assume that jurors are increasingly lenient. Why has this
87. Law & Order receives high ratings and has spun off three series: Law & Order: Special Victims
Unit, Law & Order: Criminal Intent, and the now-defunct Law & Order: Trial by jury.
88. See, e.g., Vidmar et al., supra note 7.
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happened? This Part suggests three possible explanations besides the CSI
effect.
A. Sympathy for the Defendant
It can never be completely clear why any jury acquits a defendant. Before
the CSI effect was posited, verdicts contrary to the judge's weighting of the
evidence were often ascribed to juror sympathy for the defendant.8 9 A review of
the evidence on sympathy by Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar argues that
sympathy effects occur, albeit infrequently. Drawing upon the findings of
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, 9° Hans and Vidmar suggest that when juries
are more lenient than judges, the difference stems from sympathy
approximately twenty percent of the time. 9' They note, however, that
sympathy seems most important when the evidence is equivocal, and is
activated primarily when there are grounds in the evidence for having
reasonable doubt.92 Their review suggests that when evidence is strongly
against the defendant, juries tend to convict; when it is weak, they tend to
acquit. But, when evidence is unclear, mixed factors such as sympathy and
prejudice assume a stronger role in the decisionmaking process. 93
Can sympathy explain increases in acquittals? Every trial is unique, so it is
difficult to know when defendants appear more or less sympathetic to juries.
But there is considerable evidence that juries are increasingly willing to accept a
variety of excusing conditions, ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder to
battered wife syndrome.94 This trend may reflect increasing willingness to
sympathize with the defendant and her situation.9"
89. The literature on sympathy is reviewed in VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
JURY 132-36 (1986).
go. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
g. HANS &VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 135.
92. See id. It is also important to note that in the classic research reported in The American Jury,
the judge was used as an informant about the thinking of the jury. These findings indicate
that, in the cases involved in the study, the judge thought that the jury was influenced by
sympathy. See KALVEN &ZEISEL, supra note 90, at 85-103.
93. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 90, at 115.
94. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 461
(sth ed. 2002).
9S. While sympathy is sometimes put forward by the press to explain verdicts, see, e.g., Carrie
Johnson, Jury Acquits HealthSouth Founder of All Charges, WASH. POST, June 29, 2005, at Al;
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1077
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
B. Differing Thresholds for Conviction
The CSI effect is linked to the belief- typically articulated by prosecutors -
that jurors acquit defendants when they should convict. An alternative
explanation of these acquittals is that prosecutors make unrealistic assessments
as to the strength of their cases relative to jurors' assessments. In other words,
perhaps the fact to be explained when considering the CSI effect is not the
reality of acquittals themselves, but the widespread evidence that these
acquittals are troubling to prosecutors. 96 It may be that the CSI effect is more a
symptom of prosecutors trying to understand why their expectations are not
confirmed than a reflection of actual changes in the behavior of jurors.
How might a prosecutor develop such an unrealistic assessment of the
strength of her case? One possibility is that prosecutors erroneously assume
that juries and judges will make similar decisions about guilt or innocence. If
prosecutors share the standards of judges-either because they deal with
judges every day or because they share legal training and common experience -
then they would view bench verdicts as their baseline for reasonableness. And
to the extent that jurors acquit where a judge would convict, jurors may seem
to hold standards that are too high.
There is, in fact, evidence that judges and jurors use different standards
when determining guilt and innocence. Kalven and Zeisel's classic study, The
American Jury, found that judges have a lower conviction threshold than do
juries.97 Recently, Theodore Eisenberg and others used a sample of three
hundred trials in four locales to partially replicate the findings of Kalven and
Zeisel. 9s This later study also found juries less likely to convict than judges
when reacting to the same cases. Kalven and Zeisel attribute this difference to
the jurors applying a higher threshold for proof beyond reasonable doubt
(rather than judges applying a lower one). Likewise, in the Eisenberg
Ben White, In Scrushy Trial, Jurors Chose Defense's Portrait, WASH. POST, June 29, 20o05, at
Di, it may or may not be the true reason for such verdicts.
96. It is perhaps surprising that legal authorities view jurors as too lenient, as one of the primary
criticisms of the criminal justice system in public opinion polls is that legal authorities are
not tough enough on criminals. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC
OPINION: LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES (2003); JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J.
STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 2 (1997).
97. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 90, at 58-59.
98. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of
Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).
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replication, the authors concluded that "juries require stronger evidence to
convict than judges do."99
Where could this leniency come from? The highly salient mass media
culture of crime and criminal justice is only one of many possible explanations.
Jurors may be more sympathetic to the general idea that "there but for the
grace of God go I," being more able than judges to see themselves in the same
situation as the defendant.
Although the inflated-expectations explanation is consistent with classic
and recent findings about judge-juror differences in verdicts, it does not
address the perception among prosecutors that juries are increasingly likely to
acquit. Researchers have not systematically tracked the judge-jury discrepancy
over time, so we do not know if the relative tendency to convict between judges
and juries is constant or changing. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether
this explanation is suitable for understanding the CSI effect. However, the
similarity of the findings in the classic Kalven and Zeisel study and the more
recent work by Eisenberg suggests constancy over time.
C. Declining Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities
Another explanation for increasing jury acquittals, and one that is linked to
change over time, is that jurors, like members of the general public, are
becoming less trusting of legal authorities. Acceptance of the case put forward
by the prosecution during a criminal trial is heavily dependent upon a juror's
willingness to trust the honesty and the competence of the state -including the
police (who investigate crimes) and the prosecutors (who manage criminal
trials). Conducting a trial is an exercise in persuasion in which the authorities
need to convince the jury that someone is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Persuasion research indicates that people are less persuaded by others when
they regard them as less competent, less trustworthy, or both."° Other studies
establish that trust is a central dimension against which members of the public
evaluate legal authorities. 01
99. Id. at 189; see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 255, 266-68 (2005) (finding juries more lenient in criminal trials but not
necessarily in civil trials).
1oo. See Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion
Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 323 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds.,
1998) (providing an overview of what is known about the conditions under which
persuasion is effective).
ioi. See TOM R. TYLER &YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002).
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Consider the O.J. Simpson case as an example of the role that trust in the
prosecution plays in juror reactions to a case.10 2 During that trial, Simpson's
lawyers raised doubts about the adequacy of the police investigation and the
handling of police evidence. The detective in the case, Mark Fuhrman, was
attacked as untrustworthy because he was alleged to have racist motives,
revealed through statements made outside the courtroom and outside the
context of the case. Hence, one alternative explanation for the acquittal in that
trial is that the jury was suspicious of the competence and motivation of the
police and the prosecution. 
1 3
Statistics reported by the National Institute of Justice illustrate the public
opinion background within which the legal system operates. A recent article
reports that "Gallup polls over the last few years have consistently found that
Americans have less confidence in the criminal justice system than in other
institutions, such as banking, the medical system, public schools, television
news, newspapers, big business, and organized labor."' 4 In a 2000 Gallup poll
of Americans, only twenty-three percent of whites and twenty-five percent of
blacks expressed confidence in the criminal justice system. When asked about
local courts, thirty-six percent of whites expressed confidence but only sixteen
percent of blacks." 5 More generally, Americans' trust in government has
declined sharply since the 196os.1° 6
Thus, people may be increasingly unwilling to convict defendants based
upon a constant level of evidence presented to them by increasingly distrusted
102. For discussions of the Simpson trial, see VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FrvE REASONS
WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER (1996); and MARK FUHRMAN, MURDER IN
BRENTWOOD (1997).
103. While trust typically turns on issues of integrity, it also involves competence. Recent mass
media reports of evidence fabrication and incompetence in police laboratories exemplify the
type of reporting that would be expected to undermine public confidence in the competence
of legal authorities involved in investigating crimes. See Cole, supra note 69; Michael J. Saks
& Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309
SCIENCE 892 (zoo5); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA
Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999).
104. Lawrence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in Criminal justice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Mar.
2002, at 22, 23.
ios. Id. at 23.
106. GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 96-104 (1998); Gary.Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of
Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT 77, 79-81 (Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. et al. eds., 1997).
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legal authorities.' 7 The problems created by declining trust in legal authorities
are not new. In the past several decades there have been a number of efforts to
restrict the discretionary authority of legal actors whose motives were viewed
as suspect. An initial focus of such efforts was on judges, whose ability to
sentence has been constrained by the application of sentencing guidelines and
three-strikes laws.Os In addition, the police have been a focus of concern, as
studies suggest that members of the public often suspect officers of racial
profiling. 0 9 In each case, the underlying issue has been the decreasing
willingness of members of the public to allow legal authorities to exercise their
best judgment because of concerns that legal actors are not motivated by a
genuine concern for the well-being of all the people in their communities. A
similar skepticism is found when members of a jury do not trust the
prosecution to have conducted a thorough, competent, good-faith
investigation.
These findings on confidence and trust suggest the possibility that juries
are less likely to convict because they increasingly lack trust in the legal
authorities who are responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal
cases." ° If that is the case, the question is what might reinforce the credibility
of these authorities? One possibility is an increase in the perceived reliability of
scientific evidence. From this perspective, the CSI effect is two sided. CSI may
raise the standards for assessing guilt, but the use of scientific evidence may
also increase the credibility of the state. At least, the scientific community
seems to have higher credibility than does the state, suggesting that the
107. One reason for the decline of trust in government is that media depictions of law and crime
often feature prosecutors who lack competence and integrity. See Macaulay, supra note 82, at
199. This is not universally true, however, as the investigators on CSI and the lawyers on
Law & Order are presented in a positive way.
1o8. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil
Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. CoMP. L. 871, 874 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the
Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 847, 861 (1998).
iog. See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice,
Attributions ofMotive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2004).
11o. The increasing distrust of legal authorities might explain why jurors are less inclined to
accept the arguments and directives of prosecutors, police officers, and judges. However, it
might also mean that jurors, and the public more generally, will feel more freedom to act on
their own feelings, ignoring the law and the suggestions of legal authorities. Because the
public is often quite punitive and is widely found to view judges as too lenient, this may
mean that the jury would feel free to convict and harshly punish defendants irrespective of
the arguments of prosecutors and the directives of judges. Hence, the way that low trust and
confidence influence jurors will depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and the
type of victim and defendant involved.
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association of the prosecution with science ought to increase trust and
confidence in the state. As noted above, the investigators in CSI always get
their perpetrator, conveying an image of competence that may influence juror
views of authority. Hence, CSI may counter increasing distrust and skepticism
regarding the law and legal actors."'
If jurors are less inclined to accept prosecutorial arguments due to general
distrust and lack of confidence, the criminal justice system can respond in two
ways. First, individual prosecutors can build personal trust and confidence
through their actions. Second, the state can build general trust and confidence
in its authorities and institutions. A judge or prosecutor can draw upon a
reservoir of trust from the general legitimacy of the law and the legal system.
Based upon such legitimacy, he can anticipate that the jury will be inclined to
trust his reasons for acting rather than question his credibility and integrity.
Because such institutional trust has declined -leading jurors to be more
skeptical of the state and state actors- legal authorities must increasingly create
their own legitimacy through personal actions." 2 The police, for example,
cannot count on deference due to their status as police officers. Instead, police
officers go to community meetings or engage in community policing patrols so
that community residents know them personally and will defer to them based
upon their personal trustworthiness. 3
To the degree that declining trust and confidence in legal authorities
underlie the perceived increase in acquittals, evidence about how to combat
that problem is clear. Studies show that trust and confidence-both on a
personal and on an institutional level -are created or undermined primarily in
reaction to the manner in which authorities exercise their authority. In other
words, they are responsive to procedural justice. 14
111. CSI investigators do have to testify in court, but they don't like it. For example, upon
returning from court, one investigator, Warrick, states bluntly: "It sucked. I hate lawyers, I
hate court. They all need to dry up and die." CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Viva Las Vegas
(CBS television broadcast Sept. 23, 2004) (transcript available at
http://twiztv.comVscripts/csi/season5/csi-5ol.txt).
112. The creation of legitimacy through personal actions is addressed in NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 291-326 (Wesley
Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
113. See id. at 61, 298.
114. See E. ALLAN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 6-7, 115-57 (1990); TYLER & Huo, supra
note ioi, at 49-57; Tyler, supra note 76.
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Why is such trust and confidence important? People need to feel
comfortable with the verdict reached, even when the "truth" of the case cannot
be known. The processes of the trial build trust and confidence in the state and
the prosecution, leading the community to feel comfortable with the
uncertainty inherent in the verdict. Unlike in Perry Mason, criminal suspects are
seldom moved to confess their guilt in open court. On the contrary, almost all
defendants proclaim their innocence, at least until they make a bargain as part
of a plea deal. And, of course, high-profile trials are high profile precisely
because the defendants have declined to plead out their cases. Hence, the
process of inferring guilt most frequently requires judges and juries to make
sense of conflicting evidence. To reconcile this task with convicting someone of
a crime - a serious and solemn act - the jury must have confidence in the
integrity and competence of the prosecution, as well as in the fairness of the
trial procedures. This requires the state to produce evidence that can convince
the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It also requires
that the state make clear that the procedures of the trial are fair -including an
accurate and unbiased presentation of the facts -and that the rights of the
defendant are of concern to the state. In other words, jurors need to see that
the prosecution is motivated by the desire to do what is right for both the
victim and the defendant-i.e., to achieve justice. This is fundamentally an
issue of trust and of procedural justice, because the jury is not able to observe
the investigation directly and cannot know whether it was thorough and
unbiased.11 It is the procedure, therefore, that legitimates the verdict in the
face of uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
The CSI effect has become an accepted reality by virtue of its repeated
invocation by the media. Although no existing empirical research shows that it
actually occurs, on a basic level it accords with the intuitions of participants in
the trial process.
The suggestion that watching CSI might raise juror standards is consistent
with empirical findings in other areas of legal psychology. There are large
115. For my previous work on the meaning of procedural justice in legal contexts, see TYLER &
Huo, supra note l1; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 435 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); and Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
283 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003).
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research literatures in the field supporting the argument that the mass media
presentation of crime could produce a CSI effect of some kind. These
literatures suggest that media presentations of background material shape juror
verdicts in specific cases. Further, these effects occur even when people are
instructed not to take account of the background material. Hence, it is entirely
plausible that watching CSI shapes juror standards. While these studies focus
on prior presentations of factual data about real crimes, there is evidence in the
mass media literature that people do not adequately distinguish between the
presentation of real crimes and the presentation of fictionalized crimes. These
various mass media presentations of crime blur into a general message that
shapes the attitudes and beliefs of members of the public.
It is equally plausible, however, that CSI might have an effect opposite of
that which has been suggested. CSI might aid the prosecution by lowering
juror standards. The psychological literature on reactions to crime
demonstrates that people want to see justice for victims. In the aid of this
desire, standards for evidentiary sufficiency waver. The emotional desire to
punish the criminal and restore the moral balance of the community can
overwhelm the cognitive search for truth.
When jurors are motivated to identify and punish a wrongdoer, they can
exaggerate the value of scientific evidence, viewing it as overly conclusive.
People generally overvalue scientific evidence and engage in an active process
of distortion to create justifications for decisions that they want to make. By
providing increased legitimacy for scientific evidence, CSI may encourage
people to make scientific evidence the focus of their justification efforts. And,
of course, people can lower their standards as well. As an example, death-
qualified juries do not distort the quality of the evidence but have a lower
threshold to convict. This second mechanism for justification is also identified
in studies of the impact of pretrial publicity. People who come into a trial
biased have a lower threshold of evidence to establish guilt.
More specifically, when the desire for justice for the victim is greater than
the desire for justice for the defendant, jurors may engage in the type of
justifications that would lead to a reverse CSI effect -raising the perceived
probative value of the evidence and increasing the likelihood of conviction. For
example, when an innocent victim is harmed by a remorseless perpetrator of
dubious character, we should expect to see these motivations come into play.
Finally, this Review suggests that there are alternative explanations for the
allegedly increasing acquittal rate that has led to speculation about a possible
CSI effect. First, juries may have increased sympathy for defendants. Second,
juries may simply be less likely to convict than people with legal training and
court experience expect them to be. Third, as the public's trust and confidence
in the courts and the law decline, jurors may be increasingly skeptical of, and
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less inclined to defer to, the arguments of legal authorities. To the degree that
any of these three alternative explanations is correct, there may be an increase
in acquittals that is not linked to watching CS1. The effect may exist, but it may
not be a CSI effect.
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